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This paper analyses the evolution of the elasticity of labour demand and the role of offshoring 
therein using industry-level data for a large number of OECD countries. The first main finding 
is that the wage elasticity of labour demand has increased substantially. The finding that 
employment has become increasingly sensitivity to wages is shown to be robust to a wide 
variety of econometric specifications of labour demand, although some of this association may 
reflect a trend increase in the speed of adjustment rather than an increase in the long-run wage 
elasticity. A second finding is that more intensive offshoring is associated with more elastic 
labour demand, consistent with increased offshoring having expanded the flexibility of firms to 
adjust the mix of domestic workers and foreign value-added in production when relative factor 
prices change. More in particular, the average elasticity of labour demand appears to be about 
30% to 40% larger in absolute value than the counter-factual elasticity which would have 
prevailed had offshoring not been possible. Increases of this magnitude might well have 
important implications for job security and worker bargaining power.  Finally, we find some 
evidence that strict employment protection legislation weakens the link between offshoring and 
higher labour demand elasticity. This suggests that the impact of offshoring on labour demand 
elasticity depends on the national institutional environment. 
 
JEL classification: F16 
 





1.  Introduction 
2.  Theoretical background 
3.  Econometric framework and data 
4.  The trend labour demand elasticity 
5.  Offshoring, labour market institutions and the elasticity of labour demand 
6.  Concluding remarks  Non-Technical Summary  
 
Much previous work on the labour market effects of globalisation has focused on the way trade changes 
the structure of labour demand across different sectors of the economy and types of workers. In effect, 
globalisation is represented as a series of incremental demand shocks to which labour markets need to 
adjust. The overwhelming consensus in the literature is that the total gains accruing to workers from 
globalisation greatly exceed the losses, although there will be both winners and losers in the absence of 
compensating government interventions.  
 
The sanguine view of the labour market impact of globalisation that predominates in the academic 
literature stands in contrast to more alarmist perceptions frequently expressed in the public debate. A 
German Marshall Fund poll released at the end of 2006 finds that while most of the respondents in 
seven OECD countries agree that freer trade yields benefits to business and consumers, approximately 
one-half of them also believe that “freer trade costs more jobs than it creates”. A 2005 Eurobarometer 
opinion poll further showed that more of the European Union’s population has a negative than a positive 
view of globalisation (46% versus 37%) and that negative views often reflect concerns over job losses or a 
“race to the bottom” in employment conditions. Widespread public unease about globalisation may reflect 
globalisation-induced changes in the way the labour market adjusts to demand shocks and the nature of 
the employment relation, which go beyond to the transitory adjustment costs and relative wage 
adjustments which have been the focus of most of the academic literature. 
 
Dani Rodrik from Harvard University hypothesised that globalisation increases the responsiveness of 
employment and wages to economic shocks, by increasing the own-price elasticity of labour demand. If 
confirmed by empirical analysis, such a link could help to explain a number of concerns that regularly 
feature in the public debate. First, it may explain why workers appear to feel increasingly insecure, since 
the wage and employment effects of a given shock are amplified by an increase in the labour demand 
elasticity. Second, a more elastic labour demand would also tend to reduce the bargaining power of 
workers relative to employers, possibly contributing to explain the fall in national wage shares. Third, such 
an increase might also reduce the scope for risk-sharing arrangements between workers and firms, for 
example when firms provide stable wages to long-term workers, despite fluctuations in external labour 
market conditions. Finally, an increase in the elasticity of labour demand will make the wage and 
employment effects of non-wage costs more pronounced. 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, this paper documents how the 
elasticity of labour demand has evolved across a wide range of OECD countries. We find that the 
elasticity of labour demand has increased substantially over this period, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector.  
 
Second, the paper analyses the impact of globalisation on the elasticity of labour demand by specifically 
focusing on offshoring. The rise in offshoring, and the development of international production networks 
more generally, provides a plausible explanation behind the observed increase in the elasticity of labour 
demand as it may significantly have expanded the flexibility of firms to adjust the mix of domestic workers 
and imported intermediate inputs in production in response to changing market conditions. Our findings 
suggest that offshoring generally has tended make labour demand more elastic. In our estimation sample, 
the average elasticity of labour demand appears to be about 30% to 40% larger in absolute value than the 
counter-factual elasticity which would have prevailed had offshoring not been possible. Increases of this 
magnitude might well have important implications for job security and worker bargaining power.  
 
A final contribution of the paper is to show that labour market regulations, such as employment protection 
legislation (EPL), can influence how offshoring impacts upon labour-demand elasticity by affecting the ease with which firms can substitute between factor inputs.  Our results suggest that the link between 
offshoring and more elastic labour demand is stronger in countries where EPL is relatively weak, while in 
countries with strict EPL, offshoring does not exert a strong impact on the elasticity of labour demand    1
1. Introduction 
Much previous work on the labour market effects of globalisation has focused on the 
way trade changes the structure of labour demand across different sectors of the economy 
and types of workers. In effect, globalisation is represented as a series of incremental 
demand shocks to which labour markets need to adjust. The overwhelming consensus in the 
literature is that the total gains accruing to workers from globalisation greatly exceed the 
losses, although there will be both winners and losers in the absence of compensating 
government interventions. As concerns short-run adjustment costs, workers displaced by 
trade represent only a small share of total labour turnover and the labour market adjustment 
difficulties that they encounter appear to be similar to those experienced by other job losers 
(Kletzer, 2002; OECD, 2005). As concerns long-run effects, globalisation appears to have 
been one of the factors tending to depress the relative wages of low-skilled workers, but to 
have played a relatively limited role in the overall increase in earnings inequality during the 
past several decades (Slaughter, 2000; Feenstra, 2007). By comparison, trade generates 
large increases in average living standards (Bradford, et al., 2005). 
The sanguine view of the labour market impact of globalisation that predominates in 
the academic literature stands in contrast to more alarmist perceptions frequently expressed 
in the public debate. A German Marshall Fund poll released at the end of 2006 finds that 
while most of the respondents in seven  OECD countries agree that freer trade yields 
benefits to business and consumers, approximately one-half of them also believe that “freer 
trade costs more jobs than it creates” (GMF, 2006). A 2005 Eurobarometer opinion poll 
further showed that more of the European Union’s population has a negative than a positive 
view of globalisation (46% versus 37%) and that negative views often reflect concerns over 
job losses or a “race to the bottom” in employment conditions (European Commission, 
2005). While public perceptions may not reflect an accurate assessment of the actual labour 
market effects of globalisation, they may nevertheless provide some useful insights. In 
particular, the widespread public unease about globalisation may reflect globalisation-
induced changes in the way the labour market adjusts to demand shocks and the nature of   2
the employment relation, which go beyond to the transitory adjustment costs and relative 
wage adjustments which have been the focus of most of the academic literature.
1 
Rodrik (1997) hypothesised that globalisation increases the responsiveness of 
employment and wages to economic shocks, by increasing the own-price elasticity of 
labour demand. If confirmed by empirical analysis, such a link could help to explain a 
number of concerns that regularly feature in the public debate. First, it may explain why 
workers appear to feel increasingly insecure (see Alibert et al. 2006; OECD, 1997), since 
the wage and employment effects of a given shock are amplified by an increase in the 
labour demand elasticity.
2 Second, a more elastic labour demand would also tend to reduce 
the bargaining power of workers relative to employers, possibly contributing to explain the 
fall in national wage shares (IMF, 2007). Third, such an increase might also reduce the 
scope for risk-sharing arrangements between workers and firms, for example when firms 
provide stable wages to long-term workers, despite fluctuations in external labour market 
conditions (Bertrand, 2004). Finally, an increase in the elasticity of labour demand will 
make the wage and employment effects of non-wage costs more pronounced. 
There is little evidence to date about whether labour demand has become more elastic 
as international economic integration has deepened, although two papers using data for the 
United States find some evidence that this may be the case. Using respectively industry-
level and plant-level data for the United States, Slaughter (2001) and Senses (2006) find 
that the elasticity of labour demand increased during the 1980s for production workers in a 
number of manufacturing industries. A growing number of studies have explicitly analysed 
the impact of globalisation on the elasticity of labour demand, but the evidence is rather 
mixed. Similar to the analysis in this paper, most of these studies have used industry-level 
data to address this question. Slaughter (2001) finds only limited evidence that increased 
                                                      
1  .  Another, but not mutually exclusive, explanation is that public opinion reflects a tendency to 
scapegoat globalisation for wage stagnation and rising inequality which are largely due to other 
factors. Scheve and Slaughter (2007) argue that the recent increase in support for protectionist 
policies in the United States is closely related to “the astonishing skewness of U.S. income 
growth”. 
2 .  The relative magnitude of employment and wage changes also depends on the elasticity of labour 
supply (i.e. the slope of the labour supply curve). When labour supply is perfectly elastic, as is 
commonly assumed in firm-based theories, a more elastic labour demand results in higher 
employment volatility, but has no impact on wages. When labour supply is perfectly inelastic, 
labour demand shocks only affect the wage and an increase in demand elasticity does not affect the 
volatility of either employment or wages. However, this is an unlikely case for firm or industry-
level analysis. Intermediate values for the labour supply elasticity imply that an increase in labour 
demand elasticity increases both employment and wage volatility ceteris paribus. OECD (2007) 
provides estimates of the potential contribution of globalisation to employment and wage volatility.   3
trade integration accounts for the rising trend in his estimates of labour demand elasticity in 
the United States. Bruno et al. (2004) estimate dynamic labour demands for seven major 
OECD countries for the period 1976-1996 and find that import penetration raised the 
elasticity of labour demand in the United Kingdom, but had no such impact elsewhere. 
Molnar et al. (2007) perform similar estimations for a number of OECD countries and find 
that outward foreign direct investment may have rendered labour demand more elastic in 
the manufacturing sector, but that the opposite may have happened in the services sector.  
Several recent studies have used firm-level data to analyse this question. Fabbri et al. 
(2003) look at the probability of plant shutdown across domestic and multinational firms, 
providing some evidence that multinationals have a higher elasticity of labour demand than 
domestic firms. Similarly, Görg et al. (2006) find that multinationals in Ireland have more 
elastic labour demands than domestic firms, although this difference narrows as 
multinationals become more integrated into the local economy through supplier linkages. 
By contrast, Barba-Navaretti (2003) and Hakkala et al. (2007) find no evidence that labour 
demand is more elastic in multinational firms. Barba-Navaretti (2003) provides evidence 
that multinationals have less elastic labour demands than domestic firms in the long-run in 
a number of European countries.
3 However, he also finds that multinationals have a larger 
short-run elasticity indicating they adjust their employment levels more quickly in response 
to shocks, than do domestic firms. Finally, Senses (2006) finds that offshoring (or 
‘international outsourcing’) initially increases the elasticity of labour demand but may 
decrease it after offshoring surpasses a certain threshold. Overall, these findings provide 
some evidence that international economic integration increases the substitutability of 
domestic workers by foreign factors, but also suggest that the relationship between labour-
demand elasticities and globalisation is complex and may vary depending on the nature of 
the trade in question and the national labour market context.
4 
                                                      
3  .  He explains this finding by pointing out that multinationals tend to have higher levels of 
skill-intensity and that the elasticity of labour demand declines in the average level of skills (due to 
the greater importance of firm-specific human capital). 
4.  Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000), Krishna et al. (2001) and Hasan et al. (2007) analyse the elasticity 
of labour demand in the context of rapid trade liberalisations in various developing countries and 
also obtain mixed results. Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) do not detect a systematic relationship 
between the elasticity of labour demand and trade reform in either Chile, Colombia or Mexico. 
Krishna et al. (2001) estimate unconditional labour demands to emphasize the role of scale effects 
for Turkey but also find no relationship. Hasan et al. (2007) study changes in the elasticity of 
labour demand during the Indian trade reform. They find that trade reform increased the elasticity 
of labour demand and that the increase is more pronounced in states with relatively flexible labour 
market regulations.   4
The first contribution of this paper is to document how the elasticity of labour demand 
has evolved across a wide range of OECD countries. For this purpose, various labour 
demand models are estimated using industry-level data for the period 1980-2002 and 11 
OECD countries. We find that the elasticity of labour demand has increased substantially 
over this period, particularly in the manufacturing sector. This finding is robust to a wide 
variety of econometric specifications of labour demand. However, it is possible that a 
considerable part of the increasing sensitivity of employment to wages reflects an increase 
in the speed with which labour demand reacts to changes in relative input costs, rather than 
an increase in the long-run elasticity. While this is an important distinction, a globalisation-
induced increase in either the speed of labour demand adjustment or the magnitude of the 
long-run adjustment would be likely to increase structural adjustment pressures, as a result 
of globalisation or other factors, in the labour market. 
The paper further contributes to the literature analysing the impact of globalisation on 
the elasticity of labour demand by specifically focusing on offshoring. The rise in 
offshoring, and the development of international production networks more generally, 
provides a plausible explanation behind the observed increase in the elasticity of labour 
demand as it may significantly have expanded the flexibility of firms to adjust the mix of 
domestic workers and imported intermediate inputs in production in response to changing 
market conditions (Rodrik, 1997; Senses, 2006; Thesmar and Thoenig, 2007). Moreover, 
many of the countries analysed here witnessed a significant development of international 
production networks during the sample period, which to an important extent reflects the 
spreading practice of offshoring (OECD, 2007).  
We argue that the impact of offshoring on the elasticity of labour demand is 
theoretically ambiguous and hence ultimately an empirical issue. While offshoring is 
expected to increase a firm’s substitution possibilities between factor inputs, the elasticity 
of substitution is only one of several factors determining the own-price elasticity of labour 
demand, which are likely to be affected by offshoring. In particular, it seems reasonable to 
assume that offshoring by firms in the most developed countries will also lead to a 
reduction in the cost share of labour. Making use of a standard decomposition of the 
determinants of labour demand elasticity into substitution and scale effects, we show that a 
simultaneous increase in the constant-output elasticity of substitution and decrease in the 
cost share of labour in production will have off-setting effects on the total elasticity of   5
labour demand: reinforcing the substitution effect, while dampening the scale effect. If the 
price elasticity of product demand is large enough relative to the elasticity of substitution in 
production, than offshoring can reduce labour demand elasticity, rather than increase it.  
For this part of the analysis the paper uses industry-level data from 17 OECD countries 
to estimate the impact of offshoring on labour demand elasticity, where offshoring is 
measured as the share of imported intermediate inputs in domestic production (Feenstra, 
1996).
5 Our findings suggest that offshoring generally has tended make labour demand 
more elastic. In our estimation sample, the average elasticity of labour demand appears to 
be about 30% to 40% larger in absolute value than the counter-factual elasticity which 
would have prevailed had offshoring not been possible. Increases of this magnitude might 
well have important implications for job security and worker bargaining power.  
A final contribution of the paper is to show that labour market regulations, such as 
employment protection legislation (EPL), can influence how offshoring impacts upon 
labour demand elasticity by affecting the ease with which firms can substitute between 
factor inputs.
6 More specifically, one would expect the link between offshoring and more 
elastic labour demand to be stronger in countries where EPL is relatively weak, while in 
countries with strict EPL, offshoring is expected exert a moderate impact on the elasticity 
of labour demand. In fact, it may even make labour demand less elastic when the price 
elasticity of product demand is large enough relative to the elasticity of substitution which 
is more likely the stricter EPL. We find that, consistent with our expectations, strict EPL 
weakens the link between offshoring and higher labour demand elasticity.  
Our findings on the role of EPL accord well with previous findings reported by Hasan 
et al. (2007) and Senses (2006). Hasan et al. find that trade liberalisation in India has 
increased the elasticity of labour demand more strongly in states where employment 
protection legislation is less strict. The possibility that offshoring may reduce the elasticity 
of labour demand does not feature in their paper, however, because this possibility is 
closely tied to the specific nature of offshoring and is unlikely to apply to trade 
                                                      
5 .  Note that whilst most previous research has focused on the relative flexibility of multinationals to 
adjust their input mix across national borders, and therefore on substitution within the firm, 
offshoring defined as the share of imported intermediate inputs in production is more general. The 
latter captures substitution opportunities both within and outside the firm (i.e. though  both 
intra-firm and arm’s-length trade). 
6 .  In the presence of EPL, the effective elasticity of substitution between labour and other factors of 
production may be lower than the purely technological elasticity of substitution.   6
liberalisation generally. By contrast, Senses analyses the specific impact of offshoring on 
the elasticity of labour demand. She argues that the impact of offshoring on the elasticity of 
labour demand is nonlinear as its impact depends on the initial cost share of labour. More in 
particular, offshoring is more likely to make labour demand less elastic the smaller the 
initial cost share. She also provides empirical evidence that this is the case in US 
manufacturing.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 uses a simple decomposition of the 
own-price elasticity of labour demand to identify the multiple channels through which 
offshoring may affect labour demand elasticity. Section 3 sets out the econometric 
framework. Section 4 presents the baseline results for the evolution of labour demand 
elasticity since 1980, along with a wide range of robustness checks. Section 5 analyses the 
role offshoring and employment protection in explaining differences in the elasticity of 
labour demand across industries and countries. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Theoretical  background 
Assuming perfect competition, constant returns to scale and homogenous firms, the 
price elasticity of industry-level labour demand ηLL can be expressed as the weighted 
average of two components: i) the constant-output elasticity of substitution, σ ; and ii) the 
(absolute) price elasticity of product demand,  P η ; where the cost share of labour ,  L s , acts 
as the weighting factor (Hamermesh, 1993): 
P L L LL s s η σ η − − − = ) 1 (                                                                                                          
(1) 
The first component captures the substitution effect, which reflects the extent to which 
a firm substitutes away from labour when faced with an increase in its price, for a given 
level of output. The second component captures the scale effect, which represents the 
reduction in employment due to the reduction in output that occurs to the extent that the 
increase in labour costs leads to higher output prices and therefore lower sales. For a given 
cost share of labour, the scale and substitution effects due to a change in the wage work are   7
both negative. The larger the cost share, the greater the relative importance of the scale 
effect in determining the total elasticity of labour demand.
7 
Differentiating equation 1 with respect to offshoring (measured by the share of 
imported intermediate inputs in production,  M s ), provides a useful expression for the 
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Offshoring may thus influence the elasticity of labour demand through three channels, 
namely, its potential impacts on the elasticity of substitution, the cost share of labour and 
the price elasticity of product demand. In the absence of direct evidence concerning these 
impacts, it appears reasonable to conjecture that increased offshoring will tend to increase 
σ, decrease sL and have little or no impact on ηP: 
•  To the extent that setting up an international production network involves a 
fixed cost (Antras, 2003), the constant-output elasticity of substitution between 
workers at home and value-added produced abroad will tend to be greater for 
firms that already offshore and have thus established an international 
production network.
8 In other words, by incurring the fixed cost to set up an 
international production network firms not only can take advantage of lower 
production costs abroad, but can also increase their flexibility in production, by 
allowing them to more easily vary their input mix across locations in response 
to changes in their economic environment.
9  
                                                      
7 .  Chirinko and Mallick (2006) note that if costs shares are allowed to change the first of Marshall 
four rules of labour demand, which states that labour demand is more elastic the more easily 
substitutes for labour can be obtained, is no longer generally valid.   
8 .  In the industry-level empirical analysis in Section 5, we expect the elasticity of substitution to be 
positively correlated with offshoring intensity mainly because the latter gives an indication of the 
pervasiveness of offshoring across firms within an industry, i.e. the number of firms that has 
established an international production network in an industry. One may refer to this as the 
extensive margin of offshoring.  
9 .  Note the argument here is slightly different from that expressed in Kohler (2005) who shows that 
offshoring may be expected to increase the elasticity of substitution between domestic capital and   8
•  The impact of offshoring, which involves trade in intermediate inputs, on 
product market competition for final goods is ex ante unclear.
10 In principle, 
offshoring may have an impact on the number of available varieties (under 
monopolistic competition) or on mark-ups (under monopolistic competition or 
oligopoly). However, it is unclear how offshoring will affect market thickness 
or mark-ups and we assume that offshoring does not affect the price elasticity 
of product demand.  
•  In the literature, it is typically assumed that the most labour-intensive activities 
are offshored first, particularly when the focus is on developed countries which 
are relatively well endowed in capital and skilled labour. As a result, offshoring 
is expected to lead to a reduction in the cost share of labour. 
11 
Assuming that  0 > Δσ  and  0 < Δ L s , the expression in the first square brackets in 
equation 2 is the sum of two negative terms and hence unambiguously negative (i.e. 
L L s s Δ + Δ − − σ σ ) 1 ( < 0). That is, offshoring reinforces the substitution effect and hence 
tends to make labour demand more elastic. Assuming that  0 < Δ L s  and  P η Δ = 0, the 
expression in the second square brackets in equation (2) is unambiguously positive (i.e. 
L P s Δ −η > 0). That is, offshoring weakens the scale effect by lowering the labour cost share 
and hence the extent to which higher wages are passed through onto higher prices. Since 
the overall impact of offshoring on labour demand elasticity is the sum of offsetting 
substitution and scale effects, its sign is theoretically indeterminate.
12 Rodrik’s conjecture 
                                                                                                                                                                  
domestic labour. In his model, offshoring amplifies the effect of a change in relative price of labour 
on the substitution between capital and labour by inducing the relocation of increasingly skill-
intensive stages of production abroad. As a result, the capital-labour ratio increases by more than it 
would have done in the absence of offshoring. 
10  .  By contrast, liberalisation of trade in final goods can be expected to increase competition on 
product markets and hence to make product demand more price elastic. 
11 .  The average offshoring intensity in an industry gives an indication of the extent to which domestic 
production activities have been relocated offshore. One may refer to this as the intensive margin of 
offshoring. 
12 .  Lommerud et al. (2006) analyse a model in which offshoring necessarily reduces labour demand 
elasticity, because only the scale effect operates. In their model, monopolistic competitive firms 
produce final output using a continuum of intermediate inputs, whose production only requires 
labour. Producers can choose where to produce intermediate inputs, but cannot substitute 
intermediate input activities for each other. In this setup, offshoring dampens the scale effect, by 
reducing the cost share of domestic labour in production, making labour demand less elastic. This 
strengthens the collective bargaining position of workers who remain in employment, allowing 
them to capture a disproportionate part of the rents. The feedback effect to worker bargaining 
power reduces the incentives for firms to engage in offshoring and this disincentive is more   9
that globalisation raises the elasticity of labour demand is less likely to apply to the case of 
offshoring the larger is the price elasticity of product demand relative to the constant-output 
elasticity of substitution.
13 By contrast, this analysis suggests that Rodrik’s intuition is on 
more solid ground as concerns the impact of the liberalisation of trade in final goods.
14 
Finally, it is worth emphasising that the elasticity of labour demand at the industry-
level, as analysed here, is very different from the national labour demand elasticity in 
general equilibrium trade models. We analyse partial equilibrium elasticities defined over a 
single sector, whereas the latter models define general equilibrium elasticities over multiple 
sectors. As a result of general equilibrium effects, the former cannot be easily aggregated to 
obtain the national labour demand elasticity (Slaughter, 2001).  
3. Econometric framework and data 
3.1 The basic model 
In order to estimate the constant-output elasticity of labour demand and the total 
elasticity of labour demand we make use of both the conditional and unconditional labour-
demand models. In the conditional model, the profit-maximising level of labour demand is 
determined by minimising the costs of production conditional on output. More specifically, 
industry i’s production costs ) , ( i i i x w C  are a function of factor prices w (for the variable 
factors) and output x. By Shephard’s lemma, the partial derivatives of the cost function with 
respect to variable factor prices give factor demands.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
important in the presence of stronger trade unions. Thus, Lommerud et al. conclude that de-
unionisation, rather than unionisation as typically suggested, creates incentives for firms to relocate 
certain production activities abroad. 
13 .  More formally, equation 2 implies that offshoring will increase (absolute) labour demand elasticity 
provided that: 
 

















  Since the expression on the right-hand side of this inequality is positive,  σ η > P  is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for offshoring to reduce the wage elasticity of labour demand. Kohler 
(2004) and Senses (2006) also analyse conditions under which offshoring can make labour demand 
less elastic. They use different models which impose more structure on how offshoring affects the 
production process, than is done here. Both models imply that increased offshoring is more likely 
to make labour demand less elastic the more important is the initial scale of offshoring.  
14 .   In terms of the notation of equation 2, lower barriers to final goods trade would be expected to 
result in increased product market competition so that  0 > Δ P η and  0 = Δ = Δ σ L s , implying 
that labour demand becomes more elastic as a result of a reinforced scale effect.   10
In the unconditional labour-demand model, it is assumed that firms maximise profits, 
) , ( i i i p w Π , by choosing the optimal mix of input quantities and the level of output for 
given input and output prices. The profit-maximising quantity of factor demand is obtained 
by setting the partial derivative of profits with respect to that factor’s price equal to zero. In 
the case of labour demand, this corresponds to adjusting hiring so that the marginal value 
product of labour equals the wage.  
Log-linear specifications of the conditional and unconditional labour demand models 
are employed, which has the advantage that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities 
(Hamermesh, 1993). As is common in the literature, capital is treated as quasi-fixed (see for 
example Berman et al. (1994)). There are two reasons for doing so. First, this avoids 
measurement problems related to the user cost of capital. Second, to the extent that in the 
unconditional labour-demand model one may not be able to effectively control for the 
location of the labour demand curve, there is a risk of confounding shifts in the labour-
demand schedule with changes in its slope. Including the capital stock rather than the cost 
of capital helps to control for this, while it also leaves some scope for changes in output.
15  
Omitting country and time subscripts for ease of presentation, conditional labour 
demand in industry i is represented by: 









i y k w L ε β β α α + + + + = ∑
=
ln ln ln ln
1
0             ( 3 )  
where  L corresponds to industry-level labour demand; w  to the nominal price of 
variable factors (i.e. the wage and the price of materials); k to the capital stock, y to gross 
output and ε  to a random error term.  
Similarly, unconditional (or ‘capital-constrained’) labour demand in industry i is 
represented by: 
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15 .  This thus represents a compromise solution between identification of the labour-demand curve and 
the ability to capture scale effects in the unconditional labour-demand model. As such, one may 
alternatively like to refer to it as the capital-constrained model.   11
where  L corresponds to industry-level labour demand; w  to the price of variable 
factors; k to the capital stock, p to the price of gross output and ε  to a random error term. 
Given the homogeneity properties of the cost and profit functions, estimation efficiency 
could potentially be improved by imposing this constraint on the empirical model. 
However, Clark and Freeman (1980) argue that doing so may aggravate bias in the 
estimation when measurement error is important. As imposing homogeneity was generally 
rejected by the data, we report regression results which do not impose this restriction on the 
estimated coefficients. 
3.2 The trend in labour demand elasticity 
For the construction of our dataset we combined information from OECD STAN 
Database, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database and OECD 
STAN Input-Output Database. These databases contain industry-level data from national 
statistical offices which have been harmonised, as much as possible. The resulting dataset 
covers the period 1980-2002 for the 11 OECD countries and 20 industries identified in 
Table A1 in the annex.  
The two labour-demand models are estimated using 5-year differences. Differencing 
takes account of any time-invariant fixed effects. Long differences are used to account for 
lags in the adjustment of labour demand to shocks. Moreover, estimates based on long 
differences are less sensitive to bias due to measurement error than either fixed effects or 
first-differences (Griliches and Hausman, 1986) as well as to inter-temporal or cross-
country-differences in labour market policies that affect the speed of adjustment. In order to 
ensure that the results are not driven by changes in the composition of industries and 
countries over the estimation period, a balanced panel is used.
16 To remove some of the 
volatility in the estimated elasticity of labour demand, the estimates are based on a three-
year moving averages, rather than a single year.
17  
3.3 Offshoring, institutions and labour demand elasticity 
                                                      
16 .  Using an unbalanced panel that fully exploits the available data does not alter the message of the 
results. Not surprisingly, the differences across different specifications tend to be more pronounced, 
due to differences in the sample. 
17 .  This does not, however, affect the main results.   12
Offshoring is measured using data on imported intermediate inputs for the years 1995 
and 2000, which are obtained from the 2006 edition of the OECD’s Input-Output Database. 
Following Feenstra and Hanson (1999), we adopt two measures of offshoring intensity: 
intra-industry and total offshoring. Total offshoring refers to total imported purchases from 
all industries as a share of value-added, whereas intra-industry offshoring refers to imported 
intermediate inputs from the same industry only. As changes in imported intermediate 
inputs from the same industry are more likely to reflect new substitution opportunities 
associated with the international fragmentation of production, we prefer the intra-industry 
measure of offshoring to the broader measure. While previous research has mostly focused 
on the difference between multinationals and domestic firms, and therefore on substitution 
within the firm, the measure of imported intermediate inputs used here is more general, 
capturing substitution opportunities both within and outside the firm (i.e. though intra-firm 
and arm’s-length trade). 
Offshoring measured at the level of the industry gives an indication of i) the likelihood 
that firms in that industry are part of international production networks - the extensive 
margin of offshoring - which is positively correlated with the elasticity of substitution and 
i) the average intensity of offshoring in that industry - the intensive margin of offshoring - 
which effectively measures the share of production that has been relocated abroad. With the 
present data it is impossible to distinguish between the extensive and intensive margin of 
offshoring and therefore the extent to which offshoring affects the elasticity of labour 
demand by enhancing substitution possibilities versus by changing the cost share of labour 
in domestic production.  
In order to analyse the role of offshoring at the industry level we extend our basic 
specification for industry labour demand to include interaction terms between the wage 
variable and the average offshoring intensity in the industry. As the interaction terms are 
based on the average offshoring intensities over the sample period, there is no need to 
include the average intensities separately, because their independent effects drop out of the 
estimation model after differencing. Note that we are evaluating the effect of the average 
offshoring intensity in each industry on the elasticity of labour demand, relative to a 
situation with no offshoring. This differs from Senses (2006), who is mostly interested in 
the effect of an increase in offshoring, as that allows her to study the non-linear relationship 
between offshoring intensity and the elasticity of labour demand. In the present paper, we   13
focus on the level of offshoring since doing so exploits the relative strength of our dataset. 
Directly measuring the total effect of offshoring on the elasticity of labour demand also 
allows us to focus on a dimension of globalisation that is important from a policy point of 
view.  
While the inclusion of the interaction terms allows us to evaluate the average marginal 
effect of offshoring on labour demand elasticity, it does not take account of the possibility 
that the impact of offshoring varies across industries, countries or time, since this impact 
depends on the relative sizes of the different terms appearing in equation 2. Ideally, we 
would like to analyse how the impact of offshoring on the elasticity of labour demand 
depends on each of these terms. As the different terms of equation 2 are not directly 
observable in our data, we propose to employ data on the stringency of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) — which provides a source of exogenous variation in the 
effective elasticity of substitution — to provide an indication of the importance of this form 
of heterogeneity. Since EPL has a tendency to restrict the substitution possibilities of firms, 
it can be expected to weaken the tendency for offshoring to reinforce the substitution effect 
and hence to raise labour demand elasticity.   
Using EPL as a proxy for a relatively weak substitution effect from offshoring raises 
two potential problems. First, while employment protection clearly lowers the effective 
elasticity of substitution in the short-run, by reducing the speed with which firms adjust 
input quantities in response to economic shocks, it may not necessarily do so in the long-
run. However, even if EPL only affects the short term elasticity this may still have 
important implications for adjustment pressures for workers. Second, EPL appears to be 
positively correlated with product market regulation and hence potentially negatively 
correlated with the degree of product competition and ηP (OECD, 2002). If this is indeed 
the case, stricter EPL will tend to weaken the impacts of offshoring in both reinforcing the 
substitution effect and weakening the scale effect, so that it is no longer clear that stricter 
EPL weakens the link between offshoring and more elastic labour demand. Fortunately, it 
is straightforward to assess the suitability of EPL as a proxy for institutional factors that 
increase the strength of the scale effect relative to the substitution effect by evaluating the 
impact of EPL on the elasticity of labour demand. As we will see in Section 5, strict EPL 
reduces the constant-output and total elasticity of labour demand by approximately the 
same amount. This suggests that EPL has a significant effect on the elasticity of   14
substitution, but does not appear to be importantly related to the degree of product market 
competition. 
Accordingly, we argue that the extent to which engaging in offshoring (i.e. establishing 
an international production network) changes the elasticity of labour demand depends on 
the strictness of employment protection legislation. The stricter is EPL, the less investing in 
offshoring technologies pays off in terms of increased flexibility in production. This has 
two implications. First, this will dampen the impact of offshoring on the effective elasticity 
of substitution and the elasticity of labour demand. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, 
this will also change the relative importance of the substitution and scale effects of 
offshoring in favour of the latter. This will make it more likely for offshoring to make 
labour demand more inelastic, rather than more elastic, as is typically assumed.  
In the empirical analysis, the stringency of employment protection legislation is 
measured using internationally comparable data provided by Bassanini and Duval (2006). 
We use the EPL indices to split the sample in half between countries with relatively high 
levels of EPL and countries with relatively low EPL. Estimating labour demand models 
separately for samples of countries with strict and weak EPL regimes, we expect offshoring 
to be less strongly associated with increases in labour demand elasticity in the strict EPL 
sample.  
As before, labour demand models were estimated in five-year differences. Due to data 
availability, the dataset used to analyse the impact of offshoring on labour demand 
elasticity is quite different in terms of coverage from that used to analyse the trend elasticity 
of labour demand. The dataset covers the years 1995 and 2000 and the 17 countries and 23 
industries identified in Table A1 in the annex.  
4. Trend labour demand elasticity 
4.1 Baseline results 
This section analyses whether the elasticity of labour demand changed during the 
period 1980-2002. Figure 1 shows the estimated elasticities for our baseline models.
 The 
estimates suggest that the elasticity of labour demand has significantly increased (in 
absolute values) since 1980. The estimated elasticities range from about 0.2, in absolute 
value, at the beginning of the sample to around 0.5 towards the end of the period. This   15
evolution approximately encompasses the usual range found in other studies of labour 
demand elasticity (i.e. between 0.15 and 0.7, see Hamermesh, 1993). Re-estimating the 
elasticity of labour demand using the total number of hours instead of the total number of 
employees produces qualitatively similar the results. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The underlying estimates that were used to draw Figure 1, along with those obtained 
from a number of alternative specifications, are reported in Table  1. All the elasticity 
estimates displayed in Figure 1 are negative and statistically significant at least at the 10% 
confidence interval (see the estimates for five-year differences using all industries). Re-
estimating the same specification, but in three-year differences, leads to qualitatively 
similar results.
18 When the elasticity of labour demand is estimated separately for the 
manufacturing and the services sectors, a very similar pattern is found for the 
manufacturing industries, as for the overall economy, but there is no clear evidence of an 
increase in the elasticity of labour demand in the services sector. To the extent that services 
are less tradable than manufactured goods, this difference may indicate that globalisation is 
part of the story. However, the results for the services sector should be interpreted with 
caution, because these estimates are based on very small samples due to numerous gaps in 
the available data.
19 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The elasticities of labour demand displayed in Table 1 correspond to conditional (or 
‘constant output’) elasticities, and therefore do not capture the impact on labour demand 
elasticity of any competitive advantages in the product market resulting from offshoring. In 
order to estimate the total elasticity of labour demand, taking account of both substitution 
and scale effects, unconditional labour-demand models were also estimated over the sample 
period (Table 2). These results also suggest that the labour demand has become more elastic 
since the early 1980s. The estimated unconditional elasticities are similar to those obtained 
from the conditional model, but mostly smaller in absolute value, contrary to the prediction 
from the theory of labour demand set out in Section 2. Slaughter (2001) experienced similar 
                                                      
18 .  All the difference-specifications were estimated in three-year moving averages. 
19 .  Better coverage of manufacturing industries may also explain why the results for manufacturing are 
so similar to those for the overall economy.   16
problems using data for the United States and suggested that this arises because shifts in 
labour demand cannot be adequately accounted for with the available data.
20 For this 
reason, the focus in the remainder of this section will be on conditional elasticities, rather 
than the total elasticity of labour demand. The estimates of the conditional elasticity of 
labour demand should be interpreted as providing a lower bound of the total elasticity of 
labour demand. However, the trend increase in the estimated conditional elasticity of labour 
demand need not understate the increase in the total elasticity. Indeed, the decomposition 
analysis in Section 2 implies that offshoring will increase the conditional labour demand 
elasticity more strongly than the total elasticity, since only the latter is affected by the 
weakening of the scale effect (cf. equation 2). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. Sensitivity analysis of trend labour demand elasticity 
An important question is whether the upward trend in the estimated elasticity of labour 
demand in Figure 1 could result from problems with the empirical specification that was 
used and thus be spurious. Two key identifying assumptions were relied upon in estimating 
these elasticities: i) that the (differenced) data on sectoral employment reflect the long-term 
level of labour demand; and ii)  that labour supply is perfectly elastic. Since it is not 
possible to directly verify the validity of either of these assumptions, it is important to 
assess the robustness of the estimation results to alternative estimation strategies. 
4.2.1 Dynamic labour demand estimates 
In terms of the first identifying assumption, one worry would be that Figure  1 is 
picking up an increase in the speed with which labour demand reacts to changes in wages, 
rather than an increase in the total response, once a new equilibrium level of employment is 
reached. In recent decades, many OECD governments have implemented structural 
reforms, such as relaxing employment protection legislation or encouraging more vigorous 
product market competition, which may have had the effect of speeding up the response of 
employment to changes in the economic environment (OECD, 2006). In order to ensure 
                                                      
20.  As is shown in Table 1, including import penetration and the industry-specific exchange rate to 
control for the location of the demand curve does not make a substantial difference. However, this 
problem does not arise in the analysis of the impact of offshoring on labour demand elasticity in 
Section 5, which presents estimates based on better quality data on inputs, outputs and prices 
derived from complete input-output tables. Unfortunately, those data are only available for the 
1995-2000 period and cannot be used to analyse the trend in labour demand elasticity.   17
that the estimated trend in the labour demand elasticity captures the long-term relationship 
between wages and labour demand, the estimations were conducted in five-year 
differences, thereby removing much of the variation due to changes in short-term dynamics.  
An alternative to estimating a static labour demand model in long differences is to 
estimate a dynamic labour demand which explicitly accounts for short-term dynamics. The 





















1 1 ln ln ln ln ln     
(4) 
where L refers to labour demand in industry-country pair i at time t, w the price of 
labour and materials, x to the capital stock and output and  i ε  to a random error term. Each 
regression makes use of five years of data.
21 The dynamic model in equation (4) is 
estimated with OLS, fixed effects and difference-GMM as introduced by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The fixed effects estimates are biased due to the correlation of the 
(transformed) lagged dependent variable and the random error term. The major advantage 
of the difference-GMM is that it corrects for this bias, but this estimator also tends to yield 
less precise estimates.
22 The short-term wage elasticity is directly given by the estimated 
wage coefficient (αw). In order to calculate the long-term elasticity, one needs to adjust the 
wage coefficient using the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (α1) which 
represents an (inverse) measure of the speed of adjustment. Table 3 reports the short-term 
elasticities, the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable and the corresponding long-
term-elasticities.
23 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Both the fixed effects and GMM estimates suggest that short-term and long-run 
elasticities of labour demand have increased in absolute value, consistent with the static 
estimates of labour demand discussed above. However, the fixed effects and GMM results 
                                                      
21 .  For example, data for the period 1980-1984 were used to estimate the elasticity for 1984. 
22 .  The GMM estimates in Table 3 are however statistically significant at least at the 10% level and 
mostly at 1% level. 
23 .  Difference GMM is implemented using the two-step method. The Hansen-test on the validity of the 
instruments and Arellano-Bond test for no second order autocorrelation could not be rejected in any 
of the cases at the 5% level.    18
also differ in important ways. While the fixed effects estimates suggest that the speed of 
adjustment has declined over time and therefore that the long-term elasticity has increased 
by more than the short-term elasticity, the GMM estimates point at an increase in the speed 
of adjustment, which had a dampening effect on the trend increase in the long-run elasticity 
of labour demand. These differences suggest that the fixed effects estimates are badly 
biased and that the GMM estimates should be preferred. Fitting the long-term elasticities 
based on the GMM estimates with a regression line suggests that the long-term elasticity 
increased somewhat over the sample period, but that this increase may be considerably 
smaller than that depicted in Figure 1. In other words, our baseline results probably 
confound an increase in the speed of adjustment — potentially due to structural reforms 
enacted during this period — with increases in the long-run elasticity of labour demand to 
some extent. Nonetheless, it appears that the labour demand has become more elastic in 
both the short and long run. 
4.2.2 Wage endogeneity 
As is standard in the literature, labour demand elasticity was estimated on the 
assumption that labour supply is  perfectly elastic.
24 While such an assumption may be 
reasonable when using firm-level data, it is of questionable validity at the industry level.
25 
To the extent that this identifying assumption is violated, the elasticity of labour demand 
will be upward biased (i.e. its absolute value will be underestimate) due to the positive 
correlation between wages and labour supplies. However, the extent to which this bias 
affects the estimated change in demand elasticity over time is unclear. Should the elasticity 
of labour supply have increased over time, then the estimation results probably would be 
biased towards finding a spurious increase in the elasticity of labour demand. The trend 
increase in the labour market participation of women or the rising proportion of immigrants 
may have tended to raise labour supply elasticity during the sample period, and created 
                                                      
24.  As a result, shifts in labour supply, as captured in our regression model by changes in the wage 
variable, trace out the labour demand curve (Slaughter, 2001). The location of the labour demand 
schedule is pinned down by controlling for output and capital. Note that the regressions do not 
explicitly control for labour productivity, which may also lead to shifts in the labour–demand 
curve. R&D intensity, a standard proxy used in this context, is only available from 1987 onwards. 
In an effort to control for factor-biased technological change, import penetration and the industry-
specific exchange rate were included as a robustness check. This did not change the results in any 
significant way.  
25.  In so far as workers change sectors in response to inter-industry wage differentials in the long-run, 
as in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Viner model, the assumption of perfectly elastic labour supply may be 
less problematic over relatively long time horizons. This is another reason for estimating the model 
in five-year differences.   19
such a bias. The results presented in Figure 1 only account for this kind of bias to the extent 
that it concerns the correlation in the wage variable and the time-invariant component of 
the error term. We will now attempt to address this problem more fully using two different 
strategies: difference GMM and instrumental variable estimation. The results are reported 
in the last three columns of Table 3. 
Difference GMM not only controls for the bias that can arise from the correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term in a dynamic model, but also for 
endogeneity due to any of the other explanatory variables. We therefore re-estimate the 
dynamic model with Difference-GMM but this time explicitly treating the wage variable as 
being endogenous. The GMM estimates in the last three columns are very similar to those 
in columns 4-6, providing some indication that changes in the composition of labour supply 
are unlikely to fully account for the rise in the elasticity of labour demand.  
An alternative estimation strategy is to make use of instruments to account for changes 
in the composition of the labour force. Above we noted two changes in the composition of 
the labour force that may have rendered labour supply more elastic and thereby account for 
the observed trend in the elasticity of labour demand: increased female labour force 
participation and immigration. In order to directly address the bias that may result from 
changes in the composition of the labour force we need an instrument that affects female 
force participation and/or immigration, but not labour demand. While no suitable 
instrument could be identified for immigration, Bassanini and Duval (2006) provide a 
number of potentially useful instruments for female labour supply.
26 
Policy variables that have an important effect on female labour supply are well suited 
to account for the effect of increased female labour force participation on the elasticity of 
labour demand, as they are unlikely to be correlated with the unobserved component of 
labour demand (e.g. as a result of unobserved productivity shocks). Two such policy 
variables are considered: i) family cash benefits and ii) the relative marginal tax rate on 
“second earners”. The index of family cash benefits measures the increase in household 
                                                      
26.  In principle, the historic pattern of immigration by country of destination could provide the basis 
for constructing an appropriate instrument to account for the correlation between immigrant 
inflows and market conditions, similar to that used by Antonji and Card (1991). They analyse the 
relationship between immigration and the economic outcomes of low-skilled natives using the 
stock of foreign-born individuals by country of origin and region in 1970 as an instrument for the 
change in the population of foreign-born individuals. The instrument is based on the insight that 
immigrants tend to locate in regions with large populations of previous immigrants from the same 
country of origin.   20
disposable income from child benefits for a couple with one child. Higher benefits reduce 
the labour supply of mothers, through an income effect, while also increasing the incentive 
to have children, which may also be expected to have a negative effect on female labour 
supply. The relative marginal tax rate on second earners is defined as the ratio of the 
marginal tax rate faced by the second earner in a dual-earner couple with two children to 
the tax wedge for a single-earner couple with two children. The higher this ratio, the lower 
the incentive for the second earner — typically the wife — to participate in the labour 
force. Thus, both policy variables are expected to reduce female labour supply. Data for 
both variables were obtained from Bassanini and Duval (2006).  
In addition to these two policy variables, two other instruments for female labour 
supply were considered: the average number of children and the average number of years of 
education of the female population aged 25 years and above. These two variables are likely 
to be predetermined with respect to current market conditions, but to have an important 
effect on female labour supply. These variables may therefore be useful complements to the 
policy variables described above. Data on the number of children and the female education 
were also taken from Bassanini and Duval (2006). 
Even when using several instruments at the same time, their performance may be quite 
weak because they only vary across countries and time, and not across industries. To the 
extent that women are more likely to work in certain industries, as a result of historical or 
cultural factors, the impact of the instruments is likely to differ across industries. 
Accordingly, each of these variables was multiplied by the share of female employees in 
industry employment.
27 Since each of the transformed instruments varies along all three 
dimensions of the data, their explanatory power should be enhanced. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports the estimated labour demand elasticities for four different instrumental 
variable specifications using: i) the two policy variables; ii) the policy variables plus the 
number of children; ii) the policy variables plus female education; and finally, iv) all four 
instruments combined. While the results are fairly similar across the four specifications, 
they may also be deemed inconclusive. For the majority of years, the estimated labour 
                                                      
27 .  These shares are averaged across countries and time and are calculated from the EU Labour Force 
Survey.   21
demand elasticities are insignificant. Where the estimated elasticities are statistically 
significant, they tend to be substantially larger (in absolute value) than for the 
corresponding years in our base-line specification. This is in line with expectations, because 
female labour supply tends to be more responsive to changes in wages thereby reducing the 
scope for elasticity-dampening feedback effects, which translates into more elastic labour 
demand. Finally, the estimates continue to suggest that, if anything, labour demand has 
become increasingly elastic over time.
28 
In sum, it appears unlikely that changes in the speed of labour demand adjustment or 
the composition of labour supply can fully account for the observed increase in the 
elasticity of labour demand. Nonetheless, our estimates of the trend in labour demand 
elasticities are subject to considerable uncertainty. 
5. Offshoring, labour market institutions and the elasticity of labour demand 
5.1 Baseline results 
We now turn to the role of offshoring in explaining inter-industry differences in the 
labour demand elasticity using data for the years 1995 and 2000. The time dimension of 
this analysis is thus more limited than that for the estimates reported in Section 4, since we 
are now working with a single cross section of 5-years differences, but the country and 
industry coverage are considerably broader (cf. Table A1 in the annex). Furthermore, the 
availability of full input-output tables for 1995 and 2000 means that better measures of 
inputs, outputs and prices are available for estimating labour demand. 
The baseline results are reported in Table 5. The conditional and unconditional labour 
demands appear to be well identified. All variables have their expected sign and tend to be 
statistically significant.
29 Importantly, given the focus of this paper, the marginal effect of 
the wage is considerably larger in absolute value in the unconditional labour demand model 
                                                      
28 .  Senses (2006) is able to exploit the variation across local labour markets in wage levels to construct 
much more powerful instruments for the endogeneity of the wage when estimating labour demand 
and how it is affected by offshoring. It is reassuring that her results are largely consistent with those 
reported here, despite the absence of fully satisfactory instruments. 
29.  The price of materials and the price of output are insignificant when included simultaneously. This 
is not surprising as these variables are highly correlated due to the way they are constructed. (The 
price of materials is effectively defined as a weighted average of the price of outputs across 
industries.)   22
than in the conditional labour demand model, consistent with economic theory.
30 Evaluated 
at the sample mean values of offshoring intensity, the marginal effect in the conditional 
labour demand model equals -0.31 and that in the unconditional model -0.46 (based on 
intra-industry offshoring using all industries).
31 Both are well within the usual range of 
wage elasticity estimates surveyed by Hamermesh (1993). Moreover, these estimates do not 
vary much across the different specifications: i) whether the model is estimated for all 
industries or only manufacturing industries; and ii) whether the interaction terms are 
defined using intra-industry or total offshoring.
32 The relative sizes of the output-
conditional and total wage elasticities imply that the substitution effect in equation 1 is 
approximately twice as large as the scale effect and thus accounts for about two thirds of 
the total elasticity of labour demand. Combining these estimated elasticities with the 10 
percent average cost share of labour in the estimation sample, it is possible to back out 
estimates of the elasticity of substitution and the price elasticity of product demand (i.e. 
parameters σ and ηP in 1): the estimated elasticity of substitution is 0.34 (0.31/0.9) and the 
price elasticity of product demand is 1.5 ((0.46-0.31)/0.1).   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Offshoring has a negative and statistically significant effect on the labour demand 
elasticity in all specifications. Considering the estimated coefficients for intra-industry 
offshoring and all industries, a 10 percentage-point increase in the intensity of intra-
industry offshoring raises the absolute constant-output elasticity of labour demand by 0.025 
and the total elasticity by 0.033. These results are qualitatively unchanged when restricting 
the sample to manufacturing industries, but do differ according to the offshoring measure 
that is used to define the interaction term. A 10 percentage-point increase in the intensity of 
total offshoring raises the absolute elasticity of labour demand by only 0.001 in the 
conditional model and 0.012 in the unconditional model. Thus, intra-industry offshoring 
appears to have a stronger impact on the elasticity of labour demand than the total level of 
offshoring in an industry. This make intuitive sense because intra-industry offshoring is 
                                                      
30  .  Recall that the regression results in Section 4 generally failed to satisfy this condition. The 
estimates in Table 5 are probably better behaved because they are based on better measures of 
inputs, outputs and prices, as these measures could be derived from harmonised input-output tables. 
31  .  The mean intensity of intra-industry and total offshoring in all industries is 0.33 and 0.63 
respectively. In manufacturing, the mean intensity of intra-industry and total offshoring is 0.42 and 
0.80. The marginal effect of intra-industry offshoring on labour demand in all industries is then 
given by the coefficient on the wage variable plus 0.33 times the coefficient on the interaction term.  
32.  The results are also very similar when excluding the interaction terms.   23
more likely to substitute for domestic value-added previously performed in that industry, 
than total offshoring, which is likely to include many activities previously outsourced to 
other domestic industries.  
In order to give a clearer idea of the quantitative importance of offshoring for the 
labour demand elasticity it may be helpful to calculate the counter-factual labour demand 
elasticity in the absence of offshoring. The estimates suggest that the constant-output 
elasticity would have been -0.22 in the absence intra-industry offshoring, as compared to -
0.31 at the average level of offshoring in the estimation sample. Similarly, the total 
elasticity of labour demand would have been -0.35 in the absence of offshoring, instead of -
0.46 with the observed level of offshoring. These calculations suggest that the elasticity of 
labour demand was about 31% to 41% larger in absolute value during the period 1995-2000 
than it would have been if offshoring had not been possible. Increases of this magnitude 
might well have important implications for employment security and worker bargaining 
power.  
5.2 The role of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
We now analyse the role of employment protection legislation in influencing the 
labour demand elasticity, including how it is affected by offshoring. We first assess 
whether EPL is a useful indicator of the impact of national labour market institutions on the 
wage elasticity of labour demand. Table 6 reports estimated coefficients for a basic labour 
demand model (i.e. without a wage-offshoring interaction) that was estimated separately for 
countries characterised by, respectively, strict and weak EPL. In all cases, the elasticity of 
labour demand is considerably smaller in absolute value in countries where EPL is strict, 
than where it is weak, which is consistent with EPL depressing the effective elasticity of 
substitution below the level of substitution that is technologically feasible. Moreover, the 
difference between the constant-output and the total elasticities of labour demand does not 
appear to depend on the EPL regime. This suggests that the impact of EPL on the elasticity 
of labour demand operates largely through its impact on the elasticity of substitution and 
that EPL is not serving as a proxy for lower product market competition. The often large 
differences in the estimated coefficients between the weak and strong EPL samples 
suggests that these estimates may be picking up the effect of EPL in slowing employment 
adjustment, along with its impact in lowering the size of the adjustment in long-run 
equilibrium.   24
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Tables 7a and 7b report estimation results for labour demand models that include the 
interaction between the wage variable and the level of offshoring. As before, we observe 
that EPL is an important determinant of the elasticity of labour demand. Looking first at the 
results for all industries, the marginal wage effects of offshoring evaluated at the sample 
mean varies from -0.18 to -0.39 in countries with relatively strict EPL, whereas it varies 
from -0.57 to -0.73 in countries with weak EPL. Again EPL mostly affects the elasticity of 
labour demand through its impact on the elasticity of substitution. This can be seen by 
comparing the relative size of the marginal wage effects across EPL regimes for, 
respectively, the conditional and unconditional specifications. In countries with strict EPL 
the constant-output elasticity (about -0.18) accounts for slightly more than half of the total 
elasticity (that ranges from -0.28 to -0.39). Under weak EPL, the constant-output elasticity 
(ranging from -0.57 to -0.59) accounts for about 80% of the total elasticity (that ranges 
from -0.68 to -0.73).  
[Insert Tables 7a and 7b here] 
The results based on manufacturing industries alone are qualitatively similar. However, 
the differences discussed above tend to be more extreme and the estimates somewhat less 
precise due to smaller sample sizes. In countries with strict EPL, the constant-output 
elasticity (ranging from -0.12 to -0.15) accounts for less than half of the total elasticity 
(ranging from -0.28 to -0.36). Under weak EPL, the constant-output elasticity (ranging 
from -0.81 to -0.83) accounts for around 85% of the total elasticity (ranging from -0.91 to -
0.96). 
The analysis on EPL strictness thus suggests that EPL affects labour demand elasticity 
primarily by diminishing the elasticity of substitution and hence the contribution of the 
substitution effect to the total elasticity of labour demand. On this basis, we would expect 
offshoring to increase the elasticity of labour demand more strongly in countries where 
EPL is relatively weak. Indeed, offshoring may even reduce elasticity in the context of 
strict EPL: as EPL becomes more binding, the offshoring-induced weakening of the scale 
effect becomes relatively larger compared with the offshoring-induced reinforcement of the 
substitution effect.   25
Our empirical results confirm the hypothesis that offshoring increases labour demand 
elasticity more strongly in countries where EPL is weak. The wage-offshoring interaction 
term is typically insignificant in countries with strong EPL, but negative and statistically 
significant in countries with weak EPL. This suggests that strict EPL prevents firms from 
taking advantage of the greater flexibility that potentially can be derived from operating an 
international production network. Indeed, the estimation results for the manufacturing 
sector indicate a weakly significant positive effect of offshoring on the total elasticity of 
labour demand in the strict-EPL sample. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
 
In this paper, we analyse the evolution of the wage elasticity of sectoral labour 
demand since 1980, paying particular attention to the role of offshoring. This analysis 
makes use of industry data for a wide range of OECD countries. The first main 
finding is the elasticity of labour demand has increased substantially during the last 
two decades. This finding is shown to be robust to a wide variety of econometric 
specifications of labour demand, although we are not able to clearly differentiate 
between a trend increase in the speed of employment adjustment and an upward trend 
in the long-run wage elasticity. Both faster and larger adjustments to changes in 
market conditions are likely to increase adjustment pressures in labour market, 
although they may also bring important gains in allocative efficiency. 
The second main finding is that both offshoring and national institutional 
environments — as illustrated by differences in EPL strictness — play an important 
role in explaining differences in the elasticity of labour demand across industries and 
countries. In a first attempt to improve our understanding of the determinants of the 
elasticity of labour demand, we focussed on the role of offshoring, which represents 
one specific form of technological change. The estimation results indicate that the 
recent rise in offshoring may help to account for the simultaneous increase in the 
elasticity of labour demand. Such a relationship is plausible in that it seems likely 
that the development of international production networks may have significantly 
expanded the flexibility of firms to adjust the mix of domestic workers and foreign 
value-added in production in response to changes in market conditions.   26
We also emphasise that the role of offshoring is complex and depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the elasticity of substitution in production, the labour cost 
share and the price elasticity of product demand, as well as how strongly all three are 
affected by the expansion of offshoring. Dividing our sample between countries with 
strict and weak EPL, we show that the link between offshoring and more elastic 
labour demand only holds in countries where  EPL is relatively weak. Offshoring 
does not appear to make labour demand more elastic in countries with strict EPL. In 
fact, there is some weak evidence that offshoring makes labour demand less elastic.  
The paper suggests a number of useful areas for further work intended to 
further clarify both the impact of trade on labour demand elasticity and the 
implications of this impact for labour market functioning and the welfare of workers. 
As concerns the impact of trade on elasticity, this paper’s analysis underlines the 
heterogeneity of these impacts, both by arguing that the impact of offshoring is likely 
to be quite different from that of trade in final goods and by showing that the national 
institutional context — as illustrated by EPL strictness — appears to have a major 
influence on the impact of offshoring. Progress in constructing better measures of 
different forms of trade and relevant labour market institutions could make an 
important contribution to obtaining more reliable estimates of the impacts of trade on 
the sensitivity of labour demand to relative factor prices. We suspect that firm-level 
data will also need to play a large role, since the use of industry-level data in this and 
a number of earlier papers makes it somewhat problematic to identify the labour 
demand curve. As concerns the implications for labour market functioning, some 
pioneering work has suggested that globalisation may be related to the falling wage 
share in national income (IMF, 2007) or greater employment and earnings insecurity 
for workers (OECD, 2007). Increased labour demand elasticity could represent an 
important intervening variable in any such links between globalisation and the 
overall functioning of the labour market. However, this conjecture awaits serious 
empirical analysis.   27
ANNEX  
Variable Definitions 
Employment      Log of total persons engaged. 
Wage          Log of total labour costs divided by the number of employees. 
Materials          Log volume of materials at 2000 constant prices. 
Price of materials      Log price index of materials. 
Data adjustments: For observations for which information on the price of 
materials was not available, the price of materials was imputed. The 
composition of inputs was obtained from the input-output tables. The price 
index of materials was imputed by multiplying the share of   total  purchases 
(domestic plus imported) by industry  i from supplying industry j in total 
intermediate purchases (domestic plus imported) by industry i with the price of 
value-added of industry j. 
Capital stock        Log volume of gross capital stock at 2000 constant prices. 
Data adjustments: For countries for which the capital stock was not available or 
industry coverage was insufficient, capital stocks were reconstructed from gross 
fixed capital formation using a perpetual-inventory method based on an 
assumed depreciation rate of 10%. 
Output          Log volume of output at 2000 constant prices. 
Price of output       Log price index of output. 
Mark-up          Ratio of value-added over the wage bill. 
Intra-industry offshoring   Ratio of imported intermediate inputs from the same industry to value-added. 
Total offshoring       Ratio of total non-energy intermediate inputs imported from abroad to value-added.   28
Sample Coverage 
Table A1: Sample coverage  
  Countries  Industries (ISIC Rev. 3) 
Section 4 - The trend labour 
demand elasticity 
Austria, Belgium & Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
the United Kingdom and the 
United States 
15-16, 17-19, 20, 21-22, 23, 
24, 25, 26, 27-28, 29-33, 34-
35, 36-37, 40-41, 45, 50-52; 
70, 55, 60-64, 65-67, 75, 80-
99 
Section 5 - Offshoring, labour 
market institutions and the 
elasticity of labour demand 
Australia, Austria, Belgium & 
Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United States 
15-16, 17-19, 20, 21-22, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 36-37, 40-41, 45, 
50-52; 70-71;73-74, 55, 60-
63, 72 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
a)
Figure 1. Trend in the conditional wage elasticity of labour demand, 1980-2002
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year  Coef. S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   
1983  -0.286  0.086  ***                      
1984  -0.267  0.065  ***                      
1985  -0.257 0.059 ***  -0.220 0.096 **  -0.276 0.132 **  -0.303 0.135 **  -0.193  0.074 *** 
1986  -0.194 0.057 ***  -0.229 0.072 *** -0.250 0.087 *** -0.280 0.095 ***  -0.263  0.094 *** 
1987  -0.094 0.058   -0.173 0.056 *** -0.153 0.066 **  -0.166 0.070 **  -0.262  0.086 *** 
1988  -0.103 0.058 *  -0.101 0.054 *  -0.041 0.063   -0.048 0.061   -0.272  0.100 *** 
1989  -0.237 0.117 **  -0.116 0.065 *  -0.094 0.084   -0.144 0.086 *  -0.200  0.075 *** 
1990  -0.350 0.125 ***  -0.261 0.115 **  -0.324 0.159 **  -0.381 0.152 **  -0.118  0.056 ** 
1991  -0.299 0.156 *  -0.389 0.130 *** -0.515 0.178 *** -0.501 0.155 ***  -0.082  0.071  
1992  -0.169 0.062 ***  -0.285 0.129 **  -0.330 0.172 *  -0.291 0.138 **  -0.112  0.080  
1993  -0.159 0.060 ***  -0.173 0.067 *** -0.152 0.083 *  -0.143 0.070 **  -0.197  0.089 ** 
1994  -0.256 0.061 ***  -0.164 0.063 *** -0.153 0.075 **  -0.215 0.066 ***  -0.227  0.091 ** 
1995  -0.282 0.068 ***  -0.218 0.067 *** -0.219 0.078 *** -0.266 0.071 ***  -0.194  0.085 ** 
1996  -0.384 0.062 ***  -0.263 0.068 *** -0.275 0.080 *** -0.289 0.072 ***  -0.153  0.067 ** 
1997  -0.476 0.061 ***  -0.364 0.060 *** -0.411 0.073 *** -0.386 0.071 ***  -0.141  0.050 *** 
1998  -0.527 0.063 ***  -0.481 0.058 *** -0.568 0.069 *** -0.513 0.064 ***  -0.157  0.046 *** 
1999  -0.481 0.070 ***  -0.554 0.055 *** -0.661 0.063 *** -0.600 0.062 ***  -0.195  0.046 *** 
2000  -0.459 0.058 ***  -0.532 0.060 *** -0.621 0.074 *** -0.611 0.072 ***  -0.221  0.047 *** 
2001  -0.395 0.072 ***  -0.471 0.057 *** -0.509 0.073 *** -0.565 0.077 ***  -0.278  0.054 *** 
2002  -0.331 0.084 ***  -0.397 0.071 *** -0.407 0.089 *** -0.439 0.091 ***  -0.314  0.058 *** 
Robust standard errors, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a) OLS estimates using five-year differences. 
b) Import penetration rates and industry-specific exchange rates were added to the model to control for the location of the 
demand curve.   34
















year Coef.  S.E.    Coef. S.E.    Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   
1983 -0.168  0.093  *                       
1984 -0.202  0.069  ***                      
1985  -0.225 0.059 ***  -0.219 0.094 **  -0.249  0.136 *  -0.225 0.142  -0.162  0.081  * 
1986  -0.210 0.057 ***  -0.261 0.071 *** -0.269  0.093 *** -0.255 0.099 ** -0.244  0.099  ** 
1987  -0.112 0.056 **  -0.203 0.057 *** -0.181  0.073 **  -0.175 0.075 ** -0.251  0.089  *** 
1988  -0.111 0.059 *  -0.125 0.055 **  -0.085  0.067   -0.093 0.066  -0.267  0.102  *** 
1989  -0.235 0.119 **  -0.128 0.068 *  -0.132  0.094   -0.181 0.093 * -0.195  0.077  ** 
1990  -0.328 0.121 ***  -0.264 0.119 **  -0.341  0.167 **  -0.395 0.161 ** -0.110  0.057  * 
1991  -0.259 0.149 *  -0.385 0.131 *** -0.501  0.180 *** -0.488 0.154 *** -0.080  0.071   
1992  -0.098 0.059 *  -0.249 0.117 **  -0.271  0.150 *  -0.227 0.112 ** -0.109  0.079   
1993  -0.118 0.067 *  -0.131 0.059 **  -0.107  0.069   -0.109 0.059 * -0.170  0.099  * 
1994  -0.217 0.068 ***  -0.135 0.066 **  -0.120  0.079   -0.209 0.069 *** -0.217  0.099  ** 
1995  -0.261 0.068 ***  -0.202 0.068 *** -0.196  0.080 **  -0.256 0.073 *** -0.187  0.090  ** 
1996  -0.364 0.062 ***  -0.253 0.067 *** -0.257  0.079 *** -0.272 0.073 *** -0.139  0.068  ** 
1997  -0.439 0.063 ***  -0.351 0.058 *** -0.394  0.073 *** -0.370 0.072 *** -0.135  0.052  ** 
1998  -0.501 0.063 ***  -0.458 0.058 *** -0.545  0.070 *** -0.494 0.067 *** -0.161  0.047  ** 
1999  -0.455 0.072 ***  -0.536 0.056 *** -0.644  0.065 *** -0.581 0.065 *** -0.203  0.046  *** 
2000  -0.439 0.057 ***  -0.516 0.063 *** -0.606  0.076 *** -0.591 0.074 *** -0.232  0.046  *** 
2001  -0.389 0.073 ***  -0.445 0.058 *** -0.484  0.076 *** -0.529 0.081 *** -0.282  0.053  *** 
2002  -0.343 0.081 ***  -0.396 0.074 *** -0.411  0.091 *** -0.447 0.090 *** -0.287  0.052  *** 
Robust standard errors, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   35
 
Table 3: Elasticity estimates from dynamic model of conditional labour demand 
 
  Fixed Effects  Difference GMM  Difference GMM with endogenous 
wage 
  αw  α1  αw /(1- α1)  αw  α1  αw /(1- α1)  αw  α1  αw /(1- α1) 
1984  -0.232  0.487  -0.452                   
1985  -0.234  0.620  -0.616               
1986  -0.154  0.727  -0.565                   
1987 -0.077  0.684  -0.243  -0.240  0.799 -1.193 -0.218  0.774 -0.965 
1988 -0.105  0.708  -0.360  -0.361  0.667 -1.085 -0.328  0.681 -1.029 
1989 -0.259  0.689  -0.832  -0.407  0.617 -1.062 -0.390  0.611 -1.001 
1990 -0.235  0.661  -0.693  -0.498  0.613 -1.285 -0.478  0.592 -1.172 
1991 -0.352  0.592  -0.863  -0.352  0.526 -0.743 -0.306  0.505 -0.619 
1992 -0.313  0.517  -0.648  -0.481  0.500 -0.963 -0.449  0.505 -0.907 
1993 -0.260  0.761  -1.085  -0.373  0.447 -0.674 -0.386  0.440 -0.689 
1994 -0.295  0.738  -1.126  -0.406  0.592 -0.996 -0.411  0.607 -1.044 
1995 -0.365  0.558  -0.825  -0.289  0.520 -0.602 -0.337  0.560 -0.766 
1996 -0.328  0.638  -0.905  -0.323  0.407 -0.544 -0.356  0.431 -0.624 
1997 -0.429  0.702  -1.438  -0.197  0.423 -0.341 -0.226  0.482 -0.437 
1998 -0.460  0.758  -1.904  -0.204  0.557 -0.461 -0.304  0.550 -0.677 
1999 -0.574  0.708  -1.968  -0.590  0.619 -1.548 -0.628  0.617 -1.639 
2000 -0.528  0.760  -2.200  -0.858  0.569 -1.991 -0.865  0.550 -1.923 
2001 -0.422  0.730  -1.563  -0.811  0.530 -1.727 -0.803  0.550 -1.787 
2002 -0.348  0.783  -1.607  -0.794  0.559 -1.800 -0.766  0.590 -1.871 
Standard errors omitted for ease of presentation.   36
Table 4: Instrumental variable estimates of conditional labour demand elasticity  






   Policy  + 
Children
b 






year Coef.  S.E.    Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   
1984                        
1985                        
1986                        
1987  -0.580 1.641   -1.841  1.729   0.585  0.577   -0.099 0.494  
1988  0.781 1.445   -0.177  0.623   0.761  0.463   0.554 0.424  
1989  0.102 2.445   -0.325  0.596   0.631  0.390   0.440 0.346  
1990  2.135 3.540   0.378  0.438   0.801  0.544   0.516 0.380  
1991  0.588 0.906   0.557  0.579   1.099  0.737   0.871 0.567  
1992  -0.266 0.371   -0.349  0.377   0.164  0.362   0.114 0.360  
1993  0.331 0.479   0.488  0.486   0.536  0.427   0.570 0.427  
1994  0.301 0.491   0.384  0.466   0.341  0.419   0.393 0.402  
1995  0.034 1.331   0.022  0.938   -0.459  1.015   -0.327 0.806  
1996  -0.432 0.786   -0.163  0.628   0.211  0.701   0.306 0.603  
1997  -0.710 0.253 ***  -0.672  0.232 ***  -0.438  0.226 *  -0.404 0.204 ** 
1998  -0.542 0.206 ***  -0.501  0.201 **  -0.416  0.193 **  -0.369 0.188 * 
1999  -0.374 0.506   -0.424  0.501   -0.229  0.512   -0.277 0.504  
2000  -1.183 0.307 ***  -1.127  0.249 ***  -1.160  0.303 ***  -1.116 0.247 *** 
2001  -0.790 0.168 ***  -0.660  0.149 ***  -0.821  0.169 ***  -0.675 0.149 *** 
2002  -0.352 0.235   -0.173  0.211   -0.404  0.235 *  -0.227 0.206  
Robust standard errors, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
a) “Policy” refers to two policy variables, namely: i) family cash benefits and ii) the relative marginal 
tax rate on “second earners”. The index of family cash benefits measures the increase in household 
disposable income from child benefits for a couple with one child. The relative marginal tax rate on 
second earners is defined as the ratio of the marginal tax rate faced by the second earner in a dual-earner 
couple with two children to the tax wedge for a single-earner couple with two children (see Section 4 of 
this paper and Bassanini and Duval (2006) for more details). Both variables are multiplied by the 
average share of female employees in total industry employment. 
b) “Children” refers to the average number of children in a country multiplied by the average share of 
female employees in total industry employment. 
c) “Education” refers to the average number of years of education of the female population aged 25 
years and above in a country multiplied by the average share of female employees in total industry 
employment.   37
 Table 5: Offshoring and the elasticity of labour demand, estimates based on 5-year 
differences 
  All industries  Manufacturing industries 
  -1-  -2-  -3-  -4-  -5-  -6-  -7-  -8- 
Log wage  -0.222 -0.348 -0.32 -0.459 -0.221 -0.368 -0.242 -0.376 
















Log capital stock  0.219 0.256 0.24 0.28 0.147 0.182 0.138 0.169 
















Log price of materials  0.458 0.221  0.397 0.233  0.466 0.421 0.394 0.328 
















Log output  0.135   0.131   0.105  0.092  
  (0.033) 
*** 
  (0.033) 
*** 
  (0.032) 
*** 
  (0.033) 
*** 
 
Log price of output   0.303   0.215   0.106  0.098 








Log wage *   -0.254 -0.328     -0.26 -0.316    











Log wage  *     -0.099 -0.124     -0.108 -0.125 
     Offshoring intensity (total) 
 








Constant  -0.008 -0.003  -0.004 0.002  -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 
















Observations  239 239  240 240  182 182 182 182 
R-squared  0.45 0.4  0.48 0.43  0.42 0.38 0.48 0.44 
            
Marginal effect wage  -0.306 -0.456  -0.382 -0.537  -0.331 -0.502 -0.328 -0.476 
















Robust standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   38
Table 6: The elasticity of labour demand across strict and weak EPL regimes, estimates 
based on 5-year differences 
  -1-  -2-  -3-  -4-  -5-  -6-  -7-  -8- 
  Manufacturing sectors  All sectors 
  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak 
Log wage  -0.103 -0.893 -0.418 -1.206 -0.169 -0.601 -0.381 -0.900 
















Log capital stock  0.343 0.353  0.4 0.671  0.427 0.454 0.456 0.741 
















Log price of materials  0.088 0.357 0.054 -0.579 0.248 0.313 0.071 -0.283 
















Log output  0.09 0.297     0.095 0.296    









Log price of output     0.100 0.774     0.241 0.473 








Constant  -0.013 0.007 -0.007 0.028 -0.014 -0.002 -0.009 0.018 
















Observations  90 68 90 68  114 94 114 94 
R-squared  0.38 0.66 0.33 0.55 0.44 0.67 0.41 0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  39
Table 7a: Offshoring, employment protection legislation and the elasticity of labour demand 
in manufacturing sectors, estimates based on 5-year differences 
  Intra-industry offshoring                                Broad offshoring 
  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak 
Log wage  -0.292 -0.698  -0.579 -0.793 -0.420 -0.715 -0.654 -0.8 
















Log capital stock  0.354 0.202  0.394 0.278 0.341 0.23  0.37 0.286 
















Log price of materials  0.048 0.665  0.021 0.174 0.010 0.506 -0.090 0.046 
















Log output  0.066 0.164     0.055 0.117    









Log price of output     0.049 0.500     0.098 0.427 








Log wage *   0.445 -0.278  0.676 -0.353      










    
Log wage  *        0.505 -0.104 0.634 -0.119 
     Offshoring intensity (total) 
 








Constant  -0.010 0.001  -0.005 0.01 -0.009 0.007 -0.005 0.016 
















Observations  90 68  90 68 90 68 90 68 
R-squared  0.39 0.74  0.37 0.72 0.42 0.8 0.41 0.79 
           
Marginal effect wage  -0.146 -0.816  -0.356 -0.959 -0.118 -0.813 -0.275 -0.911 
















Robust standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   40
Table 7b: Offshoring, employment protection legislation and the elasticity of labour 
demand in all sectors, estimates based on 5-year differences 
  Intra-industry offshoring                                Total offshoring 
  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak  Strict  Weak 
Log wage  -0.122 -0.529 -0.374 -0.636 -0.147 -0.511 -0.394 -0.604 












Log capital stock  0.425 0.435 0.456 0.562 0.428 0.444 0.454 0.548 
















Log price of materials  0.249 0.465 0.069 0.209 0.249 0.406  0.07 0.128 
















Log output  0.103 0.205     0.098 0.159    









Log price of output     0.245 0.290     0.238 0.257 








Log wage *   -0.215 -0.162 -0.051 -0.266      










    
Log wage  *       -0.060 -0.076 0.054 -0.100 
     Offshoring intensity (total) 
 








Constant  -0.014 -0.004 -0.009 0.005 -0.014 0.000 -0.009 0.008 
















Observations  114 94 114 94 114 94 114 94 
R-squared  0.44 0.69 0.41 0.66 0.44 0.72 0.41 0.71 
          
Marginal effect wage  -0.177 -0.588 -0.387 -0.732 -0.176 -0.567 -0.368 -0.678 
















Robust standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
 